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The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is
its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the
church seeks to fulfill its purpose.
Matters touching this
relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime
ecclesiastical concern.1
–Judge James P. Coleman
[E]ven though we face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still
have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream.
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the
true meaning of its creed: “We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal.”2
–Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most challenging aspects of American jurisprudence is
resolving a question that involves two conflicting fundamental rights.
Whether those rights are codified in a statute or in the United States
Constitution, courts must decide which “self-evident truth” trumps another, a
difficult proposition at best. When the right of religious freedom3 crosses
the right of an American citizen to equal protection of the laws in the form
of anti-discrimination statutes,4 courts must answer this question.
For the past forty years, the circuit courts have consistently held that,
when it comes to a religious organization’s relationship with its ministers,
religious freedom must surpass the government’s interest in eliminating

1. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558–59 (5th Cir. 1972).
2. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech at Civil Rights March on Washington
(Aug. 28, 1963), available at http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
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discrimination.5 The Supreme Court has articulated that idea in the form of
the ministerial exception—the right of churches and other religious
organizations to select their leaders free from any government interference.6
This proposition is simple enough. It is grounded in the idea of church
autonomy, a concept espoused by the Court for well over a century.7
However, the resolution of this question inevitably leads to a much more
difficult one: who and what exactly is a minister? And, equally importantly,
who decides? The circuit courts have attempted to answer those questions
since the Fifth Circuit first adopted the exception in 1972, without any clear
or consistent results.8 Some courts have adopted a “primary duties test” that
has led to inconsistency, sometimes within one circuit.9 Other courts adhere
to a strict scrutiny standard of review that violates the Establishment Clause
through excessive entanglement.10
The Supreme Court recently examined the exception for the first time in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,11 and,
although it confirmed the existence of the ministerial exception, the Court’s
unwillingness to define a clear test and put the issue to rest exemplifies the
complex nature of these questions.12 It is the complexity of the issue that
ensures no bright-line rule will work 100% of the time, making an ad hoc
test the only solution that stays true to the Religion Clauses in which the
ministerial exception is rooted.13
This Comment examines the application of the ministerial exception to
religious organizations when the question of whether the employee is a
minister is unclear. Part II explores the history of the ministerial exception.14
Part III examines current ministerial exception jurisprudence in the circuit

5. See infra Parts II.C, III.A.
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part III.B.1 (containing a full discussion of the problems with the primary duties
test).
10. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the application of a judicial standard of review, specifically
strict scrutiny); see also infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Establishment Clause and excessive
entanglement).
11. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
12. See infra Part III.C.2 (analyzing the Court’s Hosanna-Tabor opinion).
13. See infra Part IV (discussing the application of an ad hoc test); see also infra Part II (tracing
the evolution of the ministerial exception from the Religion Clauses to the church autonomy doctrine
to the first articulation of the exception in McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972)).
14. See discussion infra Part II.
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courts as well as the Supreme Court’s Hosanna-Tabor decision.15 Part IV
scrutinizes the potential impact of the decision and suggests a sensible, ad
hoc ministerial employee test before briefly concluding.16
II. THE HISTORY OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
The search for a sensible ministerial exception test must begin at its
roots: the Religion Clauses in the First Amendment to the Constitution.17 By
examining the history of the ministerial exception, jurists can find its
original spirit and succeed in establishing a test that stays true to that spirit.18
A. The Religion Clauses
The First Amendment to the Constitution states, in relevant part,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”19 The Framers debated the exact
wording of these Religion Clauses before they officially adopted the final
version that appears in the Bill of Rights.20 The language was derived, in the
main, from existing state constitutions that reflected American views at the
time on the importance of protecting religious freedom.21

15. See discussion infra Part III.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also infra Part II.C.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1481 (1990). Most notably absent from the end of the Free
Exercise Clause is the phrase “or to infringe the rights of conscience,” which was originally adopted
by the House of Representatives. Id. at 1482–84. Subsequently, bicameral passage required a
conference committee vote wherein the final version was ratified. Id. “Free exercise of religion” is
the more precise phrase of the two, which may have had something to do with its passage. “Free
exercise” unambiguously refers to action, rather than a passive belief system, indicating protection
for the practice of beliefs. Id. at 1488. “Rights of conscience” may also have been rejected because
it is ambiguous in a way that suggests a belief system based on something other than religion may be
covered by the Clause. Id. The Supreme Court reinforced this conclusion in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), when it held that a belief system cannot be based on secular considerations to
fall under the protection of the Religion Clauses—it must be based in religious belief.
21. McConnell, supra note 20, at 1456. With the exception of Connecticut (the only state with
no free exercise clause in its constitution), the states as a whole recognized religious freedom as an
inalienable right. Id. at 1455. Common elements appear in each of these state constitutional
provisions describing both the scope and the limits of the liberties enumerated. Id. at 1458–62.
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1. The Establishment Clause
Many times the Religion Clauses are separated and analyzed in
accordance with which is triggered by the facts of the case before the court.22
The landmark case for the Establishment Clause is Lemon v. Kurtzman,23
where the Court created a three-part test to determine whether certain state
statutes violated the Establishment Clause.24 In Lemon, two statutes that
gave state funding to nonpublic schools were held to be unconstitutional
because “the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the
statutes in each State involve[d] excessive entanglement between
government and religion.”25 While the statutes themselves delegated funds
to teachers who taught only non-religious material, statistics showed that the
sole beneficiaries of the statutes were Roman Catholic schools.26
The Lemon Court identified “three main evils” the Establishment Clause
was intended to combat: “sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”27 Accordingly, the Court
delineated a three-part test under which courts should analyze all
Establishment Clause issues.28 “First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the statute must not foster ‘an
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”29 Although the Court

22. See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
23. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
24. Id. at 612–13. The two statutes were separate, one from Rhode Island and one from
Pennsylvania. Id. at 607–10. Both dealt with government funding to nonpublic schools, and both
had the cumulative effect of providing state funding to Catholic parochial schools. Id.
25. Id. at 614. The Court recognized that, while technically meeting the mandate that the funds
only be available to teachers who taught non-religious subjects, the support was so permeating and
the religious goals of the Catholic parochial schools so significant, that the end result could not be
overlooked. Id. at 613. In essence, the Court looked past the goal or stated purpose of the statute to
the primary effect of the statute to find that the state was in fact sponsoring religion by funding the
parochial schools. Id. at 614.
26. Id. at 608. The statistics supporting this finding were similar for both states. In Rhode
Island, 25% of students attended nonpublic schools, and 95% of those attended Roman Catholic
schools. Id. At the time of the decision, all 250 teachers claiming benefits under the statute were
employed by Roman Catholic schools. Id. In Pennsylvania, 20% of students attended nonpublic
schools, and 96% of those attended “church-related schools,” most of which were Roman Catholic.
Id. at 610.
27. Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). The phrase “excessive
entanglement”—now tied to this case and the “Lemon test”—originated in Walz. See Walz, 397 U.S.
at 668.
28. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.
29. Id. (citation omitted). The Court later established a sub-test within part three of the Lemon
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found that the statutes clearly had a secular purpose and declined to analyze
the second part of the test, it did conclude that the third part was not met.30
Given the nature of the parochial school system within the Roman Catholic
Church, the Court found that the statutes promoted the Roman Catholic
faith, resulting in excessive entanglement.31
2. The Free Exercise Clause
There are two lines of case precedent stemming from the Free Exercise
Clause.32 The first deals with internal management and affairs relating to
church governance, which courts articulate as the church autonomy
doctrine.33 The second deals with the individual free exercise of religion
protected by the First Amendment.34 When analyzing a Free Exercise
Clause issue, distinguishing between the two lines of cases and deciding
which to follow becomes of paramount importance.35

test for entanglement. Id. at 615. Because the Establishment Clause is not the focus of this
Comment, this test will be identified but not discussed in detail. The court must examine (1) “the
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited,” (2) “the nature of the aid that the State
provides,” and (3) “the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.”
Id. In application, the Court found that the character and purpose of the schools was so pervasively
religious that the nature of the aid did not effectively separate the funding from the promotion of the
Catholic faith. Id. at 615–20. There was no guaranteed way to separate one teacher who taught both
secular and religious subjects in her use of textbooks and salaries. Despite the stipulation that the
money only fund non-religious endeavors within the school, the primary goals of the Roman
Catholic school system were too religious for this mandated separation to be realistic in practical
application. Id.
30. Id. at 613–14. The Court dismissed the first part of the test with ease, classifying the
purpose of the statutes as a secular one. Id. It then thoroughly analyzed the third part of the test, but
spent little time addressing the second part of the test. Id. at 614. The Court acknowledged a
balancing effect between the primarily religious mission of the parochial schools and precautions
taken by the legislatures to prevent entanglement through its overarching goal but declined to take
the point further given that the third element analysis was dispositive. Id. at 613–15.
31. Id. at 609; see supra note 25.
32. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1996). More specifically, the
court presented these two separate strands of law as arising purely under the Free Exercise Clause.
Id. The court later analyzed the case at bar separately under the Establishment Clause and the threepart test identified in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 465.
33. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.a.; see also, e.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese
of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing the church autonomy line of cases and the
well established principle that religious institutions have the right to govern free from state
interference); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d
343, 348 (5th Cir. 1999) (agreeing with the District of Columbia Circuit’s analysis of the two strands
of free exercise law); Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 460 (“[G]overnment action may burden the free
exercise of religion . . . in two quite different ways: by interfering with a believer’s ability to observe
the commands or practices of his faith, and by encroaching on the ability of a church to manage its
internal affairs.” (citation omitted)).
34. See supra note 33; see also discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.
35. Parties have mistakenly applied precedent from the strand of free exercise law not relevant
to the facts of their case. See, e.g., Combs, 173 F.3d at 349 (disagreeing with the notion that Smith
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a. The Church Autonomy Doctrine
The church autonomy doctrine, rooted in the Religion Clauses, provides
that “churches have autonomy in making decisions regarding their own
internal affairs.”36 Although some argue that church autonomy is protected
solely by the Free Exercise Clause,37 the Supreme Court has held that the
Establishment Clause plays an equally important role.38
The Supreme Court first recognized a church’s right to autonomy in
Watson v. Jones,39 a case concerning a property dispute between two church
factions.40 The Court held that it, along with all secular courts, was bound
by a church’s decisions in ecclesiastical matters.41 The Court recognized
that the right to free exercise of religion came with the right to organize
religious associations and to create independent church decision-making
bodies.42 The secular courts could not usurp the authority of these decisionmaking bodies without interfering with free exercise rights.43 The Watson
Court also spoke of justice when declining to intervene in the dispute:

and Boerne controlled the outcome of the case); Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462 (holding that the
burden on Free Exercise in Smith was “of a fundamentally different character” than that of the
ministerial exception).
36. Bryce, 289 F.3d at 655.
37. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981).
Laycock undertakes to distinguish between the two Religion Clauses, id. at 1378, something at
which, according to Laycock, not everyone is successful. Id. at 1379–80. The Court talks about
“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement” as the three main evils the Establishment
Clause was designed to combat, but it is unclear from where the “inhibition” implication comes. Id.
at 1382 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612). Laycock describes a straightforward dichotomy where
“Government support for religion is an element of every establishment claim, just as a burden or
restriction on religion is an element of every free exercise claim.” Id. at 1384.
38. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (holding that the National Labor
Relations Board’s attempt to exercise jurisdiction over a parochial school constituted excessive
entanglement with the Establishment Clause under Lemon).
39. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
40. The Court recognized that this holding represented a sharp departure from English doctrine
and case law but maintained that the break in tradition was acceptable—and even necessary—given
the two countries’ profoundly differing views on the relationship between government and religion.
Id. at 727–28.
41. Id. at 727 (“[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been
carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final . . . .”).
42. Id. at 728–29.
43. Id. The Court also noted that the “law . . . is committed to the support of no dogma,”
drawing from the Establishment Clause, and the act of adjudicating disputes of this nature would
come too close to doing exactly that. Id. at 728.
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Each of these large and influential bodies . . . has a body of
constitutional and ecclesiastical law of its own, to be found in their
written organic laws, their books of discipline, in their collections of
precedents, in their usage and customs, which as to each constitute a
system of ecclesiastical law and religious faith that tasks the ablest
minds to become familiar with. It is not to be supposed that the
judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical
law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each
are in reference to their own.44
The Court interpreted both of the Religion Clauses to deny civil courts the
right to adjudicate the church’s internal affairs, thus beginning the idea of
church autonomy.45
The Supreme Court had reason to revisit the church autonomy doctrine
sixty years later in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,46
when it held that a church has the right to determine whether a candidate for
chaplaincy possessed the necessary characteristics to qualify for the
position.47 The case centered on an archbishop’s refusal to appoint Gonzalez
as chaplain, deeming him unqualified.48 Though Gonzalez’s prayer for relief
included a demand for the chaplaincy appointment, the Court concluded that
because this was a spiritual matter, the appointment to the chaplaincy
ultimately was removed from the secular courts.49 The Court held thus,
despite the fact that the controversy involved civil rights:
Because the appointment is a canonical act, it is the function of the
church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a
chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them. In the
absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the
proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular

44. Id. at 729.
45. See id. at 728–29.
46. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
47. Id. at 16.
48. Id. at 12–13. Specifically, the archbishop called the boy “not legally (ecclesiastically
speaking) capacitated to the employment of a chaplaincy.” Id. at 13. He was able to tie this refusal
to solid pronouncements in canon law. Id. Not only were his objections codified, but the grounds
on which he based them were incapable of bias (or pretext, see infra note 50). For example, the
chaplaincy required a course in theology and a minimum age of fourteen years. Id. Given these
facts, it is not hard to understand why the Court did not reach the issue of a pretext question in this
case. See infra note 50.
49. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 11, 15–16.
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courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by
contract or otherwise.50
These two cases, Watson and Gonzalez, dealt with a church’s right to
“ecclesiastical jurisdiction,” that is, its right to have the final say in its
internal affairs and for those decisions not to be disturbed by the civil
courts.51 In 1952, the Supreme Court held that the Religion Clauses
prohibited the legislature—as well as the judiciary—from interfering with
free exercise of religion52 when it struck down a New York law as
unconstitutional in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church in North America.53 In Kedroff, the Court ruled that a New York
statute that “passe[d] the control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one
church authority to another[,] . . . thus intrud[ing] for the benefit of one
segment of a church . . . into the forbidden area of religious freedom” was
unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.54
The Kedroff Court recognized the church autonomy doctrine first stated in
Watson,55 but also acknowledged its extension of the doctrine to state law,
given that Watson “was decided in 1872, before judicial recognition of the
coercive power of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the limitations of
the First Amendment against state action.”56 Thus, the power of the Religion
Clauses to protect free exercise of religion was extended to both the states

50. Id. at 16. This is the first time the issue of “pretext” arose in the church autonomy context.
See id. In an examination of church autonomy doctrine history, the sincerity of a religious
organization’s claims or beliefs is occasionally at issue. See infra notes 60, 82, 90, 279, 286, 288,
344–48. Claiming that a decision is pretextual has become a go-to argument for opponents of
religious organizations. Although the facts did not implicate the pretextual question in this case, the
Court here implied that there exists a factual scenario in which asking a pretextual question is
appropriate. See Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16. However, asking whether “fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness” occurs (i.e., pretext) is a question that the Court recently rejected, saying it “misses the
point of the ministerial exception.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012); see also infra notes 344–48 and accompanying text.
51. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871); Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 13.
52. The Court further explained the ramifications of its Kedroff holding in Kreshik v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960) (“[I]t is established doctrine that ‘(i)t is not of
moment that the State has here acted solely through its judicial branch, for whether legislative or
judicial, it is still the application of state power which we are asked to scrutinize.’” (quoting NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958))).
53. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). The Court ruled thusly despite a push from the New York Court of
Appeals to permit the New York legislature to rely and act on its own knowledge of Soviet religious
attitudes. Id. at 117.
54. Id. at 119.
55. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text.
56. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 115.
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and the legislature.57
The Kedroff decision also extended another aspect of the church
autonomy doctrine—one perhaps more important to the ministerial
exception—when it held that matters of church government are as
ecclesiastical in nature as matters of faith and doctrine.58 Despite the fact
that the dispute centered on the control of a cathedral, Justice Frankfurter
maintained that it was not a simple real estate dispute, but that “power to
exercise religious authority” was the “essence” of the controversy, as the
cathedral was “the seat and center of ecclesiastical authority.”59 The Court
said that, although Watson centered on a property dispute as well, there was
a “spirit of freedom . . . from secular control or manipulation” and held that
selection of clergy must fall under the church autonomy doctrine.60
Intervention into these church governmental matters would constitute an
unacceptable breach of constitutional protection under the First
Amendment.61 The matter of control over the cathedral in Kedroff was
equally ecclesiastical in nature and thus equally protected by the Religion
Clauses.62
From Kedroff, the Court next extended the church autonomy doctrine
from governmental matters to administrative matters in Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v. Milivojevich.63 The
underlying issue in the case involved control over a diocese and its property
and assets.64 The circuit court upheld a bishop’s defrockment, but it struck
down a reorganization within the church as illegal and unenforceable and

57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
58. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116.
59. Id. at 121 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter pointed out the religious nature
of the conflict and decided that a civil court could not dispose of it without religious intervention by
the state. Id. However, one could argue that his determination of the cathedral as the “center of
ecclesiastical authority” is a religious determination, which is the thesis of Justice Thomas’s
concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor. See infra text accompanying notes 236, 350–51. This is unhelpful
in advancing the discussion about an appropriate ministerial exception test. See infra Part III.B.
60. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (majority opinion). This Court, like the Gonzalez Court,
hedged its holding: “Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven,
we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of
religion against state interference.” Id.; see supra text accompanying note 50. The phrase “where
no improper methods of choice are proven” again suggests that courts might question the underlying
pretext of a selection—an analytical path that the Court has now confirmed is inappropriate in the
ministerial exception context. See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 344–
48 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text.
63. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
64. Id. at 698. Of course, the Court ultimately did not reach the issue. Id. Church autonomy
cases are decided on procedural grounds (the equivalent of a subject-matter jurisdiction dismissal)
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)—under these circumstances, on the basis that the ecclesiastical courts have
already spoken and their decisions control.
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held that amendments to the constitution of the diocese were without force
and effect.65 The Supreme Court held, as it now had held multiple times,
that the lower court erred by adjudicating the dispute at all.66 A new issue in
this case, however, was that the nature of the controversy involved
administrative decisions incidental to the main property dispute.67 If the
Court were to hold that the decision of the “highest judicatory”68 stood, it
would mean that the church had exclusive control over administrative
matters, as well as those of faith, doctrine, and governance.69 The Court held
that, despite the civil nature of the property dispute, it was still ecclesiastical
at its core, and, therefore, still carried the risk of excessive entanglement by
the courts.70
b. Individual Free Exercise
The second strand of Free Exercise law deals with “restrictions on an
individual’s actions that are based on religious beliefs.”71 This line of cases
begins primarily with Sherbert v. Verner,72 where the Court held that a
state’s unemployment compensation eligibility policies could not restrict an
individual’s right to exercise her religious beliefs.73 In Sherbert, a member

65. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708–09.
66. Id. at 698 (“We hold that the inquiries made by the Illinois Supreme Court into matters of
ecclesiastical cognizance and polity and the court’s actions pursuant thereto contravened the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
67. See id. at 709. Because the Diocesan Bishop was the principle officer of the Diocesan
property holdings, the outcome would decide not only the religious nature of the dispute, but also
who controlled the property interest—an administrative matter. Id. The Court’s conclusion that this
resolution was appropriate under the church autonomy doctrine is well grounded in the Gonzalez
holding. See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (“[T]he
decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil
rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive.” (emphasis added)).
68. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 682 (1871). The Watson Court illustrated the
principle of the “highest judicatory” by describing the hierarchy of the Presbyterian Church, in
which the General Assembly amounts to the highest judicatory: from the local church to the
presbytery, from the presbytery to the synod, and then from the synod to the General Assembly. Id.
at 727.
69. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710 (“This principle applies with equal force to church
disputes over church polity and church administration.”).
70. See id. at 710. The Court here made it clear that, when civil matters (such as property) and
ecclesiastical matters overlap, the Religion Clauses’ protection extends over the entire dispute. See
id. Otherwise, free exercise of religion would be jeopardized. See id.
71. Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 349
(5th Cir. 1999).
72. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
73. Id. at 401–02.
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of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church was fired from her job for refusing to
work on the Sabbath.74 The state denied her subsequent application for
unemployment because she did not meet the requirement under the South
Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act that she “accept available
suitable work when offered . . . by the employment office or the
employer.”75 The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled against Sherbert and
held that the unemployment law “place[d] no restriction upon the appellant’s
freedom of religion nor [did] it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her
right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the
dictates of her conscience.”76
The Sherbert Court disagreed with the South Carolina Supreme Court’s
holding that “appellant’s ineligibility infringed no constitutional liberties,”77
and enumerated a specific test to determine whether individual liberties are
infringed when the regulated activities are outside the scope of state
legislation, meaning they present no “threat to public safety, peace or
order.”78 The Court said that:
[T]o withstand appellant’s constitutional challenge, it must be either
because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no
infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free
exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of
appellant’s religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state interest
in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power
to regulate.’79

74. Id. at 399. The sincerity of Sherbert’s religious beliefs was never at issue in the case, nor
was the fact that Sabbath observance is a basic tenet of Seventh-Day Adventism. Id. at 399 n.1.
75. Id. at 400–01. The South Carolina law required that an individual show “good cause” when
refusing to accept work. Id. The state court at every level reaffirmed the conclusion that Sherbert’s
observance of the Sabbath Day of her faith did not constitute the required “good cause.” Id.
76. Id. at 401.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 403. Free Exercise scholars have used early state constitutions to assist in
interpreting the Religion Clauses. McConnell, supra note 20, at 1456. Many of these constitutions
contained language similar to that used by the Court in Sherbert:
Nine of the states limited the free exercise right to actions that were “peaceable” or that
would not disturb the “peace” or “safety” of the state. Four of these also expressly
disallowed acts of licentiousness or immorality; two forbade acts that would interfere
with the religious practices of others; one forbade the “civil injury or outward disturbance
of others”; one added acts contrary to “good order”; and one disallowed acts contrary to
the “happiness,” as well as the peace and safety, of society.
Id. at 1461–62 (footnotes omitted).
79. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). In other
words, the Court uses a strict scrutiny standard of review to determine which interest—the
individual’s right of free exercise or the government’s right to burden it—trumps the other. See id.
It is for this reason that distinguishing between a church autonomy case and an individual free
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In the Sherbert case, the Court held that, even though the burden was
indirect (i.e., there were no criminal sanctions for the activity), it was
nonetheless an invalid restriction that infringed on Sherbert’s “constitutional
rights of free exercise.”80 The denial of benefits came directly as a result of
her religious practice, and, because “the pressure upon her to forego that
practice [was] unmistakable,” it was a clear burden on her right of free
exercise.81 When the first prong of the test was met, the Court went on to
dismiss the state’s argument that the possibility of fraudulent claims created
a “compelling state interest” to justify the burden.82 The Court argued that,

exercise case is so important. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Strict scrutiny, first
articulated by name in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), balances individual interests
against government interests:
[I]n the development of constitutional doctrine in the decades after Skinner, [it] became
increasingly formalized into a two “prong” test now referred to as “strict scrutiny” or
“compelling interest” analysis. Courts first determine if the underlying governmental
ends, or objectives, are “compelling.” . . . [T]he Court uses compelling in the vernacular
to describe [the] societal importance of the government’s reasons for enacting the
challenged law.
Because the government is impinging upon someone’s core
constitutional rights, only the most pressing circumstances can justify the government
action.
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006) (fourth alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). As Justice Scalia stated in Employment Division v. Smith, “It is
not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.” 494
U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989)); see infra note 90. Weighing the value of a specific creed—which would be unavoidable in
a strict scrutiny balancing test—would violate this principle. See infra notes 82, 279–93 and
accompanying text.
When the Court determines that an individual’s right to free exercise is acceptably burdened,
it is not placing value on one tenet over another, but instead permitting a burden on the general
practice of religion. The Court decided in Watson, and has since consistently held, that answering to
civil courts for its decisions regarding internal affairs is an unacceptable burden on a religious
organization’s free exercise. See supra Part II.A.2.a. Essentially, the Supreme Court already applied
strict scrutiny to this issue, and free exercise won—the result is the church autonomy doctrine.
80. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403–04. The Court compared acts of free exercise of religion to
acts of free speech as contemplated previously by the Court. Id. at 404 n.5 (“Under some
circumstances, indirect ‘discouragements’ undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the
exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.” (quoting Am.
Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950))).
81. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. Because the lower court’s decision forced her to choose between
following her religion and working to earn a living, the burden was of the same type that a fine
would impose. Id.
82. Id. at 406–07. The Court clarified strict scrutiny as a test requiring “only the gravest abuses”
and made it clear that a “mere[] rational relationship to some colorable state interest would [not]
suffice.” Id. at 406. The Court also declined the invitation to examine the sincerity of Sherbert’s
beliefs—a step that the state’s argument would have required—given “the prohibition against
judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs.” Id. at 407. Oral arguments in Hosanna-
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even if there was a real possibility of fraud, it did not rise to the level of a
“compelling state interest.”83 The State did not have a compelling
governmental interest to justify the clear burden, and thus the law violated
individual free exercise protections.84
In 1990, the Supreme Court declined to use the Sherbert test in
Employment Division v. Smith,85 a case that dealt with a similar
unemployment benefits claim in the state of Oregon.86 In Smith, two
employees were fired for peyote use in accordance with Native American
Church practice, and their subsequent unemployment claims were denied
because their termination was due to wrongful conduct.87 The Court held
that Oregon was allowed to prohibit peyote use and therefore was allowed to
deny benefits based on violation of that law.88
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected the Sherbert test as
limited in scope and “inapplicable to an across-the-board criminal
prohibition on a particular form of conduct”89:

Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), focused on this
judicial limitation and the consequences of questioning the motives of a religious institution that
hides behind the ministerial exception. Oral Argument at 46:30, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694
(No. 10-553), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_553. However, the
Court’s opinion dismissed the debate with ease, holding that the pretextual question argument
suggests a misunderstanding of the ministerial exception. See supra note 50; see also infra notes
344–48 and accompanying text.
83. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407. The state’s argument suggests that allowing any and all
individuals to refuse work on Saturday could compromise the unemployment system in the state. Id.
However, as the Court pointed out, the state already allowed (in express language no less)
worshippers freedom not to work on Sunday. Id. at 406. To then refuse to acknowledge an
individual’s right to the same observance on a Saturday would be clear religious discrimination. See
id.
84. See id. at 407. In closing, the Court was careful to narrow the opinion to South Carolina
unemployment law relating to a religious day of rest and made it clear that this did not represent an
act toward the establishment of a religion, but simply “nothing more than the governmental
obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences.” Id. at 409. The Court’s refusal to give
this ruling broad meaning makes interesting the fact that the entire body of case law regarding the
individual strand of free exercise revolves around use of the Sherbert test. See infra notes 80–102
and accompanying text. Nearly forty years later, Justice Scalia would make it clear that Sherbert
was only ever intended for use in an unemployment compensation context and would not be
universally applied to individual free exercise of religion. See infra note 89.
85. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
86. See id. at 874.
87. Id. Oregon law prohibited use of controlled substances unless prescribed by a medical
doctor. Id. “Controlled substance” under the Oregon law was defined in accordance with the
classifications in Schedules I through V under federal law. Id. Peyote was a Schedule I drug, and
therefore its use constituted a Class B felony. Id.
88. Id. at 890.
89. Id. at 884–85. Justice Scalia rejected the Sherbert test argument and clarified its history:
Under the Sherbert test, governmental actions that substantially burden a religious
practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. Applying that test we
have, on three occasions, invalidated state unemployment compensation rules that
conditioned the availability of benefits upon an applicant’s willingness to work under
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[G]overnment’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions
of socially harmful conduct . . . “cannot depend on measuring the
effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual
development.” To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a
law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious
beliefs, except where the State’s interest is “compelling”—
permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, “to become a law unto
himself,”—contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
sense.90
He drew a distinction between prohibiting an activity because of its religious
nature (e.g., keeping kosher) and prohibiting across the board an activity that
happens to affect a religious practice.91 Granting an exception for peyote use
would “relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes),” creating a
“constitutional anomaly.”92

conditions forbidden by his religion. We have never invalidated any governmental action
on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation.
Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than
that, we have always found the test satisfied.
Id. at 883 (citations omitted).
Justice Scalia went on to list several intervening cases in which the Court declined to follow
Sherbert. Id. at 883–84; see, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988) (declining to apply Sherbert to government construction activities on land used by Native
American Tribes “even though . . . the activities ‘could have devastating effects on traditional Indian
religious practices’”); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–701 (1986) (holding that a statute requiring
benefit applicants to provide their Social Security number was valid “regardless of whether it was
necessary to effectuate a compelling interest”); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)
(holding that Sherbert did not apply to regulations forbidding yarmulkes in military dress).
90. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia also foreclosed the possibility of a
strict scrutiny trigger when the activity is “central” to the religion. Id. at 886. “It is not within the
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs of practices to a faith, or the validity of
particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” Id. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490
U.S. 680, 699 (1989)). This form of judicial restraint is a common theme throughout this Comment,
as courts try to avoid the pretextual question often argued by litigants in ministerial exception cases.
See supra notes 50, 60, 82 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 279, 286, 288, 344–48.
91. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–78. For example, an Oregon law making the use of peyote illegal
only in Native American Church ceremony should be unconstitutional under Justice Scalia’s
analysis. See id.
92. See id. at 879, 886. Justice Scalia said that it would “produce . . . a private right to ignore
generally applicable laws.” Id. at 886. Justice Blackmun called the majority opinion a
“mischaracteriz[ation] of [the] Court’s precedents” and questioned the Court’s decision that strict
scrutiny did not apply to criminal prohibitions. Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court
split 5–1–3 in Smith, not an overwhelming majority. Id. at 873. However, seven years later a
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Three years later, in response to the Smith decision, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).93 Members of
Congress were highly critical of the Court’s decision in Smith, and passed
RFRA in an effort to restore and codify the Sherbert test that it deemed
“workable.”94 Under RFRA, Congress announced:
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of
religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First
Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise as
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise
without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith95 the Supreme Court virtually
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.
....
The purposes of this chapter are—
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner96 and Wisconsin v. Yoder97 and to guarantee its application in

substantially different Court (with four new members) came down against a universally applicable
Sherbert test again in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See infra notes 100–07 and
accompanying text.
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2006), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5), (b)(1) (2006).
95. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see supra notes 85–92 and accompanying text.
96. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see supra notes 72–84 and accompanying text.
97. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, the Court held that First Amendment free exercise
protections prevented the state of Wisconsin from compelling formal education up to the age of
sixteen. Id. at 234. Respondents were members of the Old Order Amish religion, which opposes
formal education after eighth grade. Id. at 207. The Court used in its analysis evidence that the
Amish tenets were both legitimate and sincere (despite, apparently, what is or what is not in the
“judicial ken,” see supra note 90), as well as evidence of the adequacy of the alternative education.
Id. at 222. It is one of the so-called “hybrid” cases in the Sherbert line of cases discussed in Smith.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
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all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened;
and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government.98
RFRA, in effect, reinstated strict scrutiny as the relevant constitutional
test as applied to federal laws as well as state laws.99
Four years later, the Court returned fire and struck down RFRA as
unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores.100 In Boerne, the Archbishop of
San Antonio, Texas filed suit after he was denied a zoning permit to enlarge
St. Peter Catholic Church in Boerne, Texas.101 The Archbishop challenged
the denial under RFRA, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether Congress had exceeded its power in passing the law.102 Using its
Fourteenth Amendment power to enforce due process among the States,
Congress argued that RFRA was “appropriate legislation” under Section
Five.103 However, the Court defined Congress’s enforcement power as the
ability to deter and remedy.104 In other words, the legislature has the
authority to prevent or fix constitutional violations, but not the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.105 The Court found

application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press.”).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006) (italics added) (citations omitted).
99. See id.
100. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
101. Id. at 512. The city council had recently passed a historic landmark law, under which it
argued the church fell. Id.
102. Id. at 511–12. The district court originally concluded that Congress had exceeded its power,
but the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that RFRA was constitutional. Id. at 512.
103. Id. at 517–18. The Court acknowledged that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is a
positive grant of power:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they
contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and
the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is
brought within the domain of congressional power.
Id. (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1879)).
104. See id. at 518; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976) (holding that when a
law is a well-connected remedy or deterrent, it comes within Congress’s power even if it conflicts
with “spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States”); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970) (upholding a ban on a literacy test voting requirement); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966) (protecting voting rights despite burden on the states).
105. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
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that RFRA failed to identify any specific unconstitutional behavior needing
deterrence or remedial action, but rather that its sweeping and broad nature
intruded on government at every level and imposed restrictions on the states
that the Fourteenth Amendment itself did not.106 The Court held the law
unconstitutional because, while Congress can enforce a constitutional right,
it exceeded its authority by changing the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause.107
These two lines of Free Exercise cases, as well as the Establishment
Clause Lemon test, seem to provide a comprehensive library of precedent to
assist courts in adjudicating matters of First Amendment law relating to the
Religion Clauses. However, there are still American ideals—ideals just as
fundamental as religious freedom—that conflict with the Clauses, causing
uncertainty in Religion Clause jurisprudence.108
B. Anti-Discrimination Laws
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)109 prohibits
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.110 On its face, there is a natural conflict between Title VII and the
Religion Clauses—the church autonomy doctrine specifically. Given that
religious organizations are often employers, the right to be free from
employment discrimination and the right to the free exercise of religion
cause a tension that must be resolved.
a. Relevant Provisions
Several provisions of Title VII are relevant when attempting to resolve
the tension between it and the church autonomy doctrine. Under section
703(a):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—

106. Id.
107. Id. at 519, 532.
108. See infra Part III (discussing approaches to the ministerial exception and highlighting the
resulting problems). In particular, though not the focus of this Comment, the reach of the ministerial
exception to matters such as salary is unclear, see infra notes 179–82, 238 and accompanying text, as
well as the application of the exception to different employment laws. See infra note 177.
109. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701–718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV
2007–2011).
110. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
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(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.111
Several considerations are relevant in this section. First, it must be
determined whether an organization is an employer under Title VII and
whether an individual is an employee, making the definitions section
relevant.112 Under section 701(b), an employer is “a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person . . . .”113 Under
section 701(f), an employee is:
[A]n individual employed by an employer, except that the term
“employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in
any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters
thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s
personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an
immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional
or legal powers of the office.114
If neither party falls under the employer or employee definition, the
controversy does not fall within the provisions of Title VII.115
The provision of Title VII perhaps most germane to the church
autonomy discussion is found in section 702(a):

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
For the Title VII definitions section, see id. § 2000e.
Id. § 2000e(b).
Id. at § 2000e(f).
Id.
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This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society with
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.116
This section exempts religious organizations that fall under the category of
employer from the prohibition against religious discrimination.117 In other
words, this statutory exception permits a religious organization to
discriminate based on the individual’s religious affiliations or preferences.118
b. Statutory Exceptions
It is important from the beginning to distinguish between the ministerial
exception, which is the focus of this Comment, and the statutory exception
codified in Title VII. The statutory exception under section 702(a) is
codified law passed by Congress as a built-in exception to Title VII.119
Under section 702(a), a religious organization may discriminate based on
religion, but only based on religion.120 For example, a religious employer
could still be sued under Title VII for failing to hire an individual because
she was a woman.121 In contrast, the ministerial exception is “a separate
judge-made exception rooted in the First Amendment designed to allow
religious organizations to hire and fire religious leaders according to any
criteria they choose.”122 Thus, this exception would allow a religious
organization to refuse to hire a woman because she was a woman if the court
deemed the position ministerial.123

116. Id. § 2000e-1(a).
117. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 121–22.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 119–20.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
120. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir.
1985) (“While the language of § 702 makes clear that religious institutions may base relevant hiring
decisions upon religious preferences, Title VII does not confer upon religious organizations a license
to make those same decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national origin.”); Douglas Laycock, A
Syllabus of Errors, Book Survey, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1181 (2007).
121. See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166; Laycock, supra note 120, at 1181.
122. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 782 n.1 (6th
Cir. 2010) (White, J., concurring), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); see also infra Parts II.C, III.C
(containing a full discussion of the ministerial exception and the Hosanna-Tabor case).
123. See infra Part III.A (discussing different tests used to determine the status of minister).
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2. Other Discrimination Laws124
a. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)125 was passed in
1990 and prohibits employers, employment agencies, and labor unions from
discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities based on their
disability.126 Although the ADA differs from Title VII in significant ways,
courts have held the ADA to be a general employment discrimination law
substantially similar to Title VII in application.127
The ADA contains a religious exception similar to that of Title VII.128
Under § 12113(d):
(1) In general
This subchapter shall not prohibit a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society from giving
preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion to
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
(2) Religious tenets requirement
Under this subchapter, a religious organization may require that all
applicants and employees conform to the religious tenets of such
organization.129
The legislative history shows that the ADA was not designed to broadly

124. The following are three primary employment laws; however, the list is not exhaustive. As
discussed in this Comment, the ministerial exception is potentially applicable to any employment
law.
125. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006 & Supp.
IV 2007–2011).
126. Id. §§ 12111(2), 12112(a).
127. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 777 n.6 (finding no distinction between application of
the ministerial exception to a Title VII claim and an ADA claim and also recognizing the extension
of the exception to other employment discrimination laws); Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference
of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause barred both an ADA claim and a Title VII claim based on the ministerial exception).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d).
129. Id.
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except religious entities.130 Similar to Title VII, the law allows the religious
entity to discriminate based on religious affiliation alone.131
b. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)132
prohibits employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations from
discriminating based on age.133 Under § 623:
It shall be unlawful for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this chapter.134
The ADEA applies to persons over forty years of age.135 Like Title VII and
the ADA, the ministerial exception previously has been applied to the
ADEA.136

130. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 777; see H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2 at 76–77 (1990)
(providing the following example involving a Mormon employer: “If a person with a disability
applies for the job, but is not a Mormon, the organization can refuse to hire him or her. However, if
two Mormons apply for a job, one with a disability and one without a disability, the organization
cannot discriminate against the applicant with the disability because of that person’s disability.”).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d); see also supra Part II.B.1.b.
132. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006 &
Supp. IV 2007–2011).
133. Id. § 623.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 631.
136. See Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (agreeing
with the district court that the ADEA “does not govern disputes between a religious entity and its
spiritual leaders”).
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c. The Fair Labor Standards Act
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)137 regulates conditions in
the workplace, “protect[ing] all covered workers from substandard wages
and oppressive working hours.”138 The FLSA applies to industries engaged
in interstate commerce, and its purpose is to eliminate labor conditions that
are “detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”139 The
FLSA primarily established a minimum wage,140 set overtime at time-and-ahalf,141 and eliminated most child labor.142 The coverage of employers and
employees as defined by the FLSA is similar to that of Title VII.143
However, the ministerial exception to the FLSA is based on different
grounds.144 The FLSA guidelines, as well as the floor debate, describe a
contemplated exception within the law that supports the application of a
ministerial exception: “Persons such as nuns, monks, priests, lay brothers,
ministers, deacons, and other members of religious orders who serve
pursuant to their religious obligations in schools, hospitals, and other
institutions operated by their church or religious order shall not be
considered to be ‘employees.’”145
C. The Ministerial Exception
Between Congress’s enactment of Title VII in 1964 and the Supreme

137. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006 & Supp. IV 2007–
2011).
138. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981)); see 29 U.S.C. §§
206–207.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 202.
140. Id. § 206.
141. Id. § 207.
142. Id. § 212.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 114–16.
144. See infra notes 176–78 and accompanying text. It has been suggested that the FLSA should
not have a ministerial exception. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d
299, 311 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that there is a ‘ministerial
exemption’ to the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . .”).
145. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 305 (quoting WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR
FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK § 10b03 (1967)). In contrast, courts carved out the ministerial
exception to Title VII because the statutory exception covered only discrimination based on religious
grounds. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
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Court’s decision in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich146 in
1976, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated for the first time the
ministerial exception to anti-discrimination laws in McClure v. Salvation
Army.147 The issue before the court in McClure was whether Title VII
applied to the employment relationship between a church and its ministers.148
The Salvation Army dismissed McClure from her position of officer,149 for
which she had trained for two years.150 Given that training, McClure’s status
as a minister was not disputed.151 The Fifth Circuit was very careful to
narrow its holding expressly to the “church-minister relationship.”152 The
court’s unwillingness to decide the issue as relating to other church
employees in this first ministerial exception case is telling. Even upon first
impression, it was clear that this would be a question laden with First
Amendment analysis, so much so that the court was careful not to establish a
broad rule.153
In her suit against the Salvation Army, McClure’s prayer for relief
called for reinstatement, an injunction against further discrimination
practices, and compensation for the discrepancy in her pay as compared to a
male with the same duties.154 The Salvation Army first argued that it was
exempt from Title VII laws because it was not an employer under § 701(b)

146. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
147. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); see Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,
772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that the ministerial exception to Title VII was first
articulated in McClure).
148. McClure, 460 F.2d at 554. Put another way, the question was whether religious freedom or
freedom from discrimination is more important. See Rayburn, 460 F.2d at 558 (“Only in rare
instances where a ‘compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s
constitutional power to regulate’ is shown can uphold state action which imposes even an ‘incidental
burden’ on the free exercise of religion.”); see also supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
149. McClure, 460 F.2d at 555. The court substituted the word “minister” for officer, referring to
the district court’s determination that Mrs. McClure was a minister. Id. at 554. The district court
reasoned, “The commanding officer of a corps acts as the ‘pastor’ of the corps, but both the corps
commander and every other officer of the Army stationed in the locality perform the function of
preaching to the congregation.” McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (N.D. Ga.
1971), aff’d 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
150. McClure, 460 F.2d at 555. McClure trained at the Salvation Army’s Officers Training
School. Id. At that time, the courts had long recognized the Salvation Army as a religious
organization. See generally Salvation Army v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Bennett v. City of LaGrange, 112 S.E. 482 (Ga. 1922); Hull v. Indiana, 22 N.E. 117 (Ind. 1889).
151. McClure, 460 F.2d at 556. Because the Salvation Army was widely recognized as a
religious organization and McClure was officially trained by that organization, her status as a
minister was not in question. Id. This case did not force the court to reach the difficult question of
who is a minister and who is not, which is the focus of this Comment. See infra Part III.
152. Id. at 555.
153. Id. Forty years later, the Supreme Court’s narrow holding in Hosanna-Tabor shows that it
was equally unwilling to establish such a rule. See infra Part III.C (discussing in full the Court’s
Hosanna-Tabor holding).
154. McClure, 460 F.2d at 555.
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of Title VII,155 and second that it was exempt under § 702 of Title VII156 as a
religious employer.157 Both arguments failed.158 However, in a third
alternative, the Salvation Army contended that the application of Title VII
laws to the relationship between a church and its ministers violated the
Religion Clauses.159 After a lengthy analysis, the Fifth Circuit agreed.160 It
concluded that, though this was an employment relationship under Title VII
definitions, it was a protected relationship under the church autonomy
doctrine and therefore exempt161 from Title VII laws:
The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is
its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the
church seeks to fulfill its purpose.
Matters touching this
relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime
ecclesiastical concern. Just as the initial function of selecting a
minister is a matter of church administration and government, so are
the functions which accompany such a selection. It is unavoidably
true that these include the determination of a minister’s salary, his
place of assignment, and the duty he is to perform in the furtherance
of the religious mission of the church.162
Because the selection of ministers is so central to a church’s belief system,
the application of Title VII laws to the Salvation Army would inevitably
result in interference by the state into matters of church doctrine,
government, and administration.163 As the line of cases following Watson
demonstrates, that would be an unacceptable constitutional encroachment

155. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006); see also supra text
accompanying notes 113–14.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1; see also supra text accompanying notes 115–16.
157. McClure, 460 F.2d at 556.
158. Id. at 557–58. The court held that the Salvation Army was an employer because it was
engaged in “industry affecting commerce.” Id. at 557; see supra note 114. The court found that the
Salvation Army was not exempt from this type of discrimination because the statutory exemption
only covers discrimination on religious grounds. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558; see supra note 117.
159. McClure, 460 F.2d at 556.
160. Id. at 560 (“We find that the application of the provisions of Title VII to the employment
relationship existing between The Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and its minister
would result in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden
to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.”).
161. As opposed to being covered under a Title VII statutory exemption. See supra text
accompanying notes 119–23.
162. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558–59.
163. See id.
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into the protections of the Religion Clauses under the church autonomy
doctrine.164
McClure carried the circuit courts into modern ministerial exception
jurisprudence.165 The court successfully articulated the purpose and the
spirit of the law by grounding the exception in Watson and its progeny,
thereby establishing its church autonomy roots.166 It served as a starting
point for all circuit courts to consider the application of the exception, which
most have now done.167
III. APPLYING THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION: THE CIRCUITS IN DISARRAY
A. The Circuit Court Approaches168
After McClure, other circuits followed the Fifth Circuit’s lead in
establishing a judge-made ministerial exception that went beyond the
statutory exception codified in Title VII.169 Though the circuits have
universally agreed as to the existence of a ministerial exception, in
application they have “consistently struggled to decide whether or not a
particular employee is functionally a ‘minister.’”170
1. The Primary Duties Approach
a. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has applied the ministerial exception to both Title
VII and FLSA claims. In Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day

164. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a.
165. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
167. See infra Part III.A.1–2 (analyzing the current circuit court approaches); see also cases cited
infra note 168.
168. The circuits discussed in this section are those with extensive or substantial ministerial
exception case history. However, other circuits have ruled on the exception as well. See, e.g.,
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a former Catholic college
chaplain was a minister); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the position of music director and organist of a religious diocese fell within the
ministerial exception); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir.
2002) (holding that the church autonomy doctrine barred sexual harassment claims but finding the
application of the ministerial exception unnecessary); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming that the ministerial exception bars claims by
a minister against a church but without examining the scope outside of actual clergy); Natal v.
Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. 1989).
169. See infra Parts III.A.1–2.
170. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Adventists,171 the court recognized for the first time the ministerial exception
to Title VII and articulated a ministerial employee test, holding that a
pastoral position was ministerial in nature despite the fact that an employee
in that position would never be ordained.172 Having no precedent in its own
circuit, the court relied on the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the
determination “does not depend upon ordination but upon the function of the
position.”173 The court pulled language from a law review article and stated
its rule—the “primary duties test”—thusly: “[I]f the employee’s primary
duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance,
supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious
ritual and worship, he or she should be considered ‘clergy.’”174 Though the
court took the opportunity to articulate a rule, the evidence overwhelmingly
supported the determination that the position was ministerial.175
The Fourth Circuit also has applied the ministerial exception to FLSA
claims,176 and although the court has acknowledged that the ministerial
exception to Title VII is based on constitutional principles rather than
congressional ones, it has held “that the ministerial exceptions under the two
Acts are coextensive in scope.”177 Thus, the court applied the same primary

171. 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).
172. Id. at 1168–69.
173. Id. (citing EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. 1981)).
174. Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the
Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514,
1545 (1979)).
175. Id. The holding was probably prompted by the fact, specific to this case, that the position
was one that could never be ordained under Seventh-Day Adventist doctrine. Id. This required the
court to clarify that ordination was not necessary for ministerial exception application. See id.
Without that fact, precedent indicates that the position would have fallen squarely within the
exception. See supra note 168.
The court later applied its primary duties test in EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000). There, a choir director filed discrimination claims under Title
VII, and the court found her to be a ministerial employee because “the positions [were] ‘important to
the spiritual and pastoral mission’ of the church.” Id. at 802. The Fifth Circuit also classified a
music director as ministerial. See infra notes 220–24 and accompanying text.
176. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004); Dole v.
Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990).
177. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 306. The FLSA contains a codified exception upon which the
ministerial exception is based, making it substantially different from the Title VII exception. See
supra note 145 and accompanying text. The purposes of the statutes are also quite different. The
full text of congressional findings for the FLSA states:
(a) The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of
the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being
of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to
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duties test for each.178 The court applied the test in Dole v. Shenandoah
Baptist Church,179 where a school operated by a Baptist church opposed a
suit for teacher back pay under the FLSA.180 The court determined that the
pay issues “[did] not cut to the heart of Shenandoah beliefs,” and therefore
that the church’s right of free exercise was not burdened.181 Though
Shenandoah argued that the teachers were no different from the plaintiff in
Rayburn, the court held that to give the exception this “sweeping
interpretation” because the teachers were members of the faith “would
‘create an exception capable of swallowing up the rule.’”182
More recently, the court applied the ministerial exception to the FLSA
in Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc.183 It held that
a kosher supervisor’s FLSA overtime wages claim was barred by the
ministerial exception when it found his position to be primarily religious.184
Although his main duties consisted of supervising the delivery, inspection,
and preparation of food, his primary responsibility was protecting against
violations of Jewish dietary law, which the court found to be central to
Jewish canon.185 Shaliehsabou also presented himself as clergy on his
federal tax returns, a fact that the court deemed to weigh heavily in favor of
a ministerial finding.186 Thus, Shaliehsabou was a minister because his

be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several
States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an
unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with
the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce. That Congress further finds that
the employment of persons in domestic service in households affects commerce.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 202(a)–219 (2006). The language justifies
the exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, but it might also be possible to
read into it a goal of protecting peace and safety among citizens. If so read, there is a strong
argument that FLSA does not support the application of a ministerial exception. When drafting the
Religion Clauses, the Framers took substantial language from existing state constitutions. See supra
note 21 and accompanying text. Most of these early constitutions made it clear that peace and safety
of citizens trumped free exercise of religion. See supra note 78. This question, however, is outside
the scope of this Comment.
178. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 306; see also supra text accompanying note 174.
179. 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990).
180. Id. at 1391. The suit was initiated by the federal government. Id.
181. Id. at 1397. The court examined the Shenandoah doctrine through passages in the Bible and
questioning of witnesses. Id. This seems at best a questionable approach, given the Supreme
Court’s long-standing refusal to evaluate religious doctrine. See supra notes 50, 60, 82, 90 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 279, 286, 288, 344–48 and accompanying text.
182. Dole, 899 F.2d at 1397.
183. 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004).
184. Id. at 309.
185. Id. at 303.
186. Id. at 308. In extending the ministerial exception as far as to hold that a food supervisor was
a minister, the court relied on its Raleigh holding to show that secular duties can be part of a
primarily religious position. Id.; see also supra note 175. Here again is an example of the court
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primary duties were in furtherance of the Jewish faith and its mission.187
b. The District of Columbia Circuit
In 1996, the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the primary duties test
in EEOC v. Catholic University of America.188 There, a nun filed claims
under Title VII after the Catholic university where she taught denied her
tenure.189 Relying on Fourth Circuit conclusions in Rayburn, the court held
that “the ministerial exception encompasses all employees of a religious
institution, whether ordained or not, whose primary functions serve its
spiritual and pastoral mission.”190 The precepts of the tenure position were
well-established by Catholic canon, stating the mission as “foster[ing] and
teach[ing] sacred doctrine and the disciplines related to it.”191 The court
found that the primary duties of the position were religious in nature, and
thus the employment decision fell under the ministerial exception.192
The court addressed another important question in Catholic University
when it held that the ministerial exception survived the Supreme Court’s
Smith decision.193 The Smith Court held, in relevant part, that “the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with
a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes . . . conduct that his religion prescribes . . . .”194 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) argued that because Title
VII was a “neutral law,” the ministerial exception could not stand.195 The
court disagreed, distinguishing a religious institution from an individual with
regard to the protections Justice Scalia clarified in Smith.196 In doing so, the

wading into the waters of religious interpretation by determining the importance of dietary law in the
Jewish faith. See supra notes 82, 90 and accompanying text.
187. Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 309.
188. 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). This circuit previously applied the ministerial exception in
Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
There, the plaintiff was an ordained minister—thus his ministerial status was not at issue. Catholic
Univ., 83 F.3d at 463.
189. Id. at 457.
190. Id. at 463. This language is similar to that of the Fourth Circuit. See supra text
accompanying notes 174–75.
191. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 463–64.
192. Id. at 465.
193. Id. at 462.
194. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (internal quotations omitted); see discussion
supra notes 85–92; see also infra notes 212–19 and accompanying text.
195. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 461–62.
196. Id. at 462.

673

04 ALLEN SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/13 3:19 PM

court pointed to the strand of free exercise law dealing with church
autonomy, rather than the strand dealing with individual free exercise.197
Acknowledging that these are two separate concepts, the court concluded
that the ministerial exception relies on the premise in which church
autonomy is rooted: the “fundamental right of churches to ‘decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as
well as those of faith and doctrine.’”198 Thus, the D.C. Circuit found that the
Smith holding did not disturb the ministerial exception.199
c. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit most recently applied the ministerial exception in
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School,200 where
it used the primary duties test to determine that a teacher at Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School (Hosanna-Tabor) was not a
minister for purposes of the exception.201 The plaintiff, Cheryl Perich
(Perich), filed ADA claims for discrimination and retaliation after the school
removed her from her teaching position due to her disability and
subsequently terminated her employment in retaliation against her threat of
legal action.202 The school classified teachers as either “contract” or
“called.”203 Called teachers were required to take classes in the Lutheran
faith and subsequently given the title of “commissioned minister.”204 Perich
served as a contract teacher for a short time before becoming a called
teacher.205 The district court dismissed the claims, holding that they fell
under the ministerial exception.206

197. See id.; supra Part II.A.2.
198. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian
Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
199. See id. at 463.
200. 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). The Supreme Court’s grant of
certiorari and reversal of the Sixth Circuit on January 11, 2012 is the focus of this Comment. See
infra Part III.C.
201. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 782. The Sixth Circuit first adopted the primary duties test in
Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007), where it held that ADA claims
brought by a resident in a Methodist hospital’s pastoral education program were barred by the
ministerial exception. Id. at 227. In Hollins, the court quoted language from the Fourth Circuit, see
supra text accompanying note 174, and followed its lead in adopting the primary duties test.
Hollins, 474 F.3d at 226. However, the dispositive issue in the case was whether the hospital could
and did waive that exception. Id. Thus, while it adopted the ministerial exception, the Hollins court
did not apply the primary duties test to the facts of the case. Id.
202. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 774–75. The facts of the case are discussed in further detail in
the analysis of the Supreme Court opinion. See infra Part III.C.1.
203. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 772.
204. Id.
205. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
206. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 775.
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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit applied the primary duties test to Perich’s
position.207 Following its Hollins precedent,208 the court stated:
To determine whether an employee is ministerial . . . this Circuit
has instructed courts to look at the function, or “primary duties” of
the employee. As a general rule, an employee is considered a
minister if “the employee’s primary duties consist of teaching,
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious
order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and
worship.”209
The court found that Perich’s main function was not religious for various
reasons, including the fact that an overwhelming percentage of her day was
spent teaching secular subjects; the fact that, though she had the title of
minister, other employees in her position were not required to be ministers
or members of the Lutheran Church; and the fact that her position as a
religious “role model” did not convert her teaching duties into religious
activities.210 Thus, Perich was not a minister for the purposes of the
exception.211
2. Other Approaches
a. The Fifth Circuit
In 1999, the Fifth Circuit ruled on two important ministerial exception
cases. First, in Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of the United
Methodist Church,212 the court held that the ministerial exception survived
the Supreme Court’s Smith decision.213 Combs, a female reverend, filed sex
and pregnancy discrimination claims under Title VII and argued that the

207. Id. at 778–82.
208. See supra note 201.
209. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 778 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted); see also supra note
174 and accompanying text.
210. Id. at 780. Prior to its analysis, the court pointed out that the circuits have generally held
parochial teachers not to be ministerial employees, id. at 778–79, citing Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist
Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1991), and EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th
Cir. 1986), as examples. See infra Parts III.A.1.a, III.A.2.c.
211. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 780–81.
212. 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999).
213. Id. at 349; see supra notes 85–92 and accompanying text.
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ministerial exception should not apply in light of Smith.214 Combs reasoned
that the church should not be exempt from sex discrimination laws because
they are “facially neutral,”215 and the Smith Court held that the Free Exercise
Clause did not exempt compliance with a “neutral law of general
applicability.”216
The court rejected this argument and agreed with the District of
Columbia Circuit’s analysis of the question.217 The court focused on the
distinction between the two strands of free exercise law and concluded that
Smith definitively was a product of the individual strand of free exercise.218
Thus, Smith was distinguishable from Combs, and the ministerial exception
remained alive and well.219
Shortly after the Combs decision, the Fifth Circuit faced another
ministerial exception question in Starkman v. Evans,220 where it delineated
its version of the ministerial employee test.221 In Starkman, a choir director
brought discrimination claims under the ADA, and the court concluded that
she was a ministerial employee based on a three-part test:
First, this court must consider whether employment decisions
regarding the position at issue are made “largely on religious
criteria.”. . .
Second, to constitute a minister for purposes of the “ministerial
exception,” the court must consider whether the plaintiff was
qualified and authorized to perform the ceremonies of the
Church. . . .
Third, and probably most important, is whether [the employee]
“engaged in activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or
religious,” including whether the plaintiff “attends to the religious
needs of the faithful.”222

214. Combs, 173 F.3d at 347.
215. Id. at 348.
216. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990); see also discussion supra notes 85–92 and
accompanying text.
217. Combs, 173 F.3d at 349; see also discussion supra Part III.A.1.b.
218. Combs, 173 F.3d at 349.
219. For a more extensive analysis of the ministerial exception after Smith and Boerne, see
discussion supra Part III.A.1.b. Because the questions were almost identical, the Combs court
heavily relied on the analysis of the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Catholic
University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Combs, 173 F.3d at 348–49.
220. 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999).
221. Id. at 176.
222. Id. (citations omitted). The court pulled each of these criterion from an earlier Fifth Circuit
case, EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. 1981), the
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The court determined that the employment decision was based on religious
criteria because religious music was important to the “spiritual mission of
the church;” that Starkman was authorized to perform ceremonies because
she had several religious duties; and that she attended the needs of the
faithful as a “ministerial presence.”223 Thus, Starkman was a ministerial
employee for purposes of the exception, and the Fifth Circuit adopted a clear
and cogent ministerial exception test.224
b. The Second Circuit
In 2008, the Second Circuit confirmed for the first time the existence of
a ministerial exception in Rweyemamu v. Cote,225 where it held that the
exception barred an African-American Catholic priest’s racial discrimination
claim under Title VII.226 When the Diocese promoted a white man to parish
administrator over Rweyemamu, he filed racial discrimination claims with
the EEOC and the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and
Opportunities (CHRO).227 The CHRO dismissed the claim on ministerial
exception grounds, and Rweyemamu subsequently was fired from his
position with the Diocese.228 Because Rweyemamu’s position as priest fell
squarely within the ministerial exception as articulated in McClure,229 the
court had no occasion to examine the scope of the exception as applied to
“lay employees.”230 It did, however, express its view on the matter in dicta:

first to consider employees outside the clergy for purposes of the ministerial exception. In that case,
the church’s dispute was with the EEOC itself, and the court had to decide whether the seminary in
its entirety was subject to EEOC regulations. Id. at 279. Although it was in Southwestern Baptist
that the court first articulated the test, the circumstances surrounding its application were atypical.
Id. The question was whether a religious institution was exempt from EEOC regulations, not
whether an employee was ministerial and therefore denied protection under anti-discrimination laws.
Id. Thus, it was important for the court in Starkman to reiterate the test under model ministerial
exception circumstances.
223. Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176.
224. Id. at 177. The Fourth Circuit has also held that a music-related position was ministerial.
EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); see discussion supra
note 175.
225. 520 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 2008).
226. Id. at 209.
227. Id. at 200. The Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities is Connecticut’s
equivalent to the EEOC. Id.
228. Id.
229. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); see supra Part II.C (discussing
the first application of the ministerial exception in McClure).
230. Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 208–09. (“We need not attempt to delineate the boundaries of the
ministerial exception here, as we find that Father Justinian’s Title VII claim easily falls within
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Circuit courts applying the ministerial exception have
consistently struggled to decide whether or not a particular
employee is functionally a “minister.” While we agree that courts
should consider the “function” of an employee, rather than his title
or the fact of his ordination, we still find this approach too rigid as it
fails to consider the nature of the dispute. . . . [A] lay employee’s
relationship to his employer may be “so pervasively religious” that
judicial interference in the form of a discrimination inquiry could
run afoul of the Constitution.231
This approach acknowledged the difficulty in creating a blanket rule to
determine which employees fall within the scope of the ministerial exception
and essentially advocated an ad hoc test, given that the nature of an
employee’s duties should be weighed differently according to context.232
c. The Ninth Circuit
In March of 2010, in Alcazar v. Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop
of Seattle,233 a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit adopted a ministerial
employee test similar to the Fifth Circuit’s test.234 In December 2010, the
Ninth Circuit vacated en banc the portion of the opinion that announced that
test.235 In the first case, Alcazar, a seminarian, filed an overtime wages
claim under the state of Washington’s Minimum Wage Act (Act).236 The

them.”). The Second Circuit used the term “lay employee” as distinguished from “religious
employee” to indicate an employee who is not a member of the clergy and therefore is subject to the
functionality test. Id. Given the confusion over what test to use and how to apply it, the term is
more suitable than “secular” or “non-religious,” as the “laity” is defined as “the body of religious
worshipers, as distinguished from the clergy.”
Laity Definition, DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/laity (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
231. Id. at 208 (citations omitted).
232. See supra text accompanying note 170. The Second, like most circuits, agreed that the
ministerial exception would not apply to tort liability or breach of contract claims. See Rweyemamu,
520 F.3d at 208 (“The minister struck on the head by a falling gargoyle as he is about to enter the
church may have an actionable claim.”).
233. 598 F.3d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated in part, 627 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2010).
234. See supra text accompanying note 222.
235. Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc). Although vacated in the Ninth Circuit, due to its sensible nature and usefulness in
displaying the shortcomings of the primary duties test, this Comment chooses not to vacate this test.
It will be discussed in detail.
236. Alcazar, 598 F.3d at 671. Application of the ministerial exception to suits filed under this
law is most analogous to that of the FLSA claims out of the Fourth Circuit. See supra notes 176–87
and accompanying text. However, the Ninth Circuit never seriously questioned the exception’s
applicability; on the contrary, it concluded broadly that application of the Act to the church-minister
relationship would result in entanglement. Alcazar, 598 F.3d at 672–73 (“[T]he very process of civil
court inquiry into the clergy-church relationship can be sufficient entanglement.”); see also
discussion infra Part III.C.3.
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court rejected Alcazar’s argument that “the decision whether to pay him
overtime wages ‘is not the sort of religious practice the First Amendment
shields from secular examination.’”237 Instead, the court pointed to Ninth
Circuit precedent that included the determination of a minister’s salary as
part of ministerial decisions that fall within the ministerial exception.238
As a seminarian training to become a priest, Alcazar fell squarely within
the church-minister relationship.239 Nonetheless, Alcazar next argued for the
application of the primary duties test used by the Fourth and District of
Columbia Circuits, because, at that point in his training, he primarily
performed maintenance duties for the church; thus his primary duties were
not religious.240 The court also rejected this argument and declined to adopt
the primary duties test:
Instead, we adopt a test similar to the Fifth Circuit’s and hold
that if a person (1) is employed by a religious institution, (2) was
chosen for the position based “largely on religious criteria,” and (3)
performs some religious duties and responsibilities, that person is a
“minister” for purposes of the ministerial exception.241
Alcazar was attending a pastoral ministry on his way to becoming an
ordained priest.242 According to the court, the primary duties test has an

237. Alcazar, 598 F.3d at 674.
238. Id. (“Just as the initial function of selecting a minister is a matter of church administration
and government, so are the functions which accompany such a selection[, including] the
determination of a minister’s salary . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Bollard v. Cal. Province
of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999)). In Bollard, the court held that a sexual
harassment claim did not fall within the ministerial exception, as it did not relate to the selection of
clergy. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950. In Alcazar, the classification of the salary decision under the
ministerial exception accurately reflects the spirit of the ministerial exception. See supra text
accompanying notes 159–66. However, the more appropriate context for this argument would be a
suit for unfair wages or wage discrimination based on race or sex. See McClure v. Salvation Army,
460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the Salvation Army was exempt from a discrimination
claim based on sex); see also supra notes 146–64 and accompanying text. A claim for overtime
wages is more akin to the peace and safety concerns of the FLSA. See supra note 177.
239. Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1290. When this is the case, no determination of functionality is
required. See discussion supra Part II.C.
240. Alcazar, 598 F.3d at 675. This argument exposes a major flaw in the primary duties test that
the court subsequently addressed. Id. at 675–76; see infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text. It
makes the vacation en banc unfortunate, given that it was the best articulation of the argument
against the test. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the problems with the primary duties test).
241. Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 676.
242. Id. at 670. This also adds to circuits’ agreement that actual ordination is not required. See
supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text. There should be no difference between training for
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“arbitrary 51% requirement”243 that would result in the conclusion that
Alcazar was not a ministerial employee, regardless of the fact that he was in
the middle of the ordination process.244 By examining the number of hours
dedicated to religious tasks, the overall spirit of the position may be missed,
and the integrity of the exception compromised.245 This test, the court
argued, recognizes that a ministerial employee’s job—including that of
actual clergy to whom the exception undoubtedly applies—may require the
performance of secular duties.246
The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc expressly to vacate this
test.247 The court determined that, because Alcazar’s employment fell easily
within the ministerial exception, the court’s delineation of a ministerial
The court
employee test constituted unnecessary overreaching.248
acknowledged that both parties and amici wanted a “test of general
applicability” regarding the ministerial exception, but the court declined to
adopt either another circuit’s test or the one proposed by its own three-judge
panel.249
Before Alcazar, the Ninth Circuit considered the ministerial exception in
EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass’n,250 and later in EEOC v. Fremont
Christian School.251 In Pacific Press, the employee was an editorial
secretary at a religious publishing house.252 In Fremont, the employees were
teachers at a Christian school.253 While it held that the ministerial exception
did not apply, the court did not use the primary duties test.254 Instead, the
court in both cases focused its analysis on whether the discrimination claim
in question affected the religious beliefs of the church and whether the

ordination and being ordained; both are equally ministerial for legal purposes. See supra notes 160–
67 and accompanying text.
243. Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 676. The court also made the point that this type of inquiry may
constitute excessive entanglement and thus may violate the Establishment Clause as well. Id. at 675;
see supra Part II.A.1; see also infra Parts III.B.2, III.C.3.
244. Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1292 (“We hold that the First Amendment considerations relevant to an
ordained minister apply equally to a person who, though not yet ordained, has entered into a churchrecognized seminary program to become a minister and who brings suit concerning employment
decisions arising from work as a seminarian.”).
245. See supra notes 160–67 and accompanying text.
246. Alcazar, 598 F.3d at 676.
247. Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1290.
248. Id. at 1290–91 (“The paradigmatic application of the ministerial exception is to the
employment of an ordained minister which, in cases involving Roman Catholicism, would include
priests.”).
249. Id. at 1290–92.
250. 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
251. 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
252. 676 F.2d at 1275.
253. 781 F.2d at 1364.
254. Id. at 1370.
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state’s interest in preventing the discrimination outweighed the resulting
burden on free exercise.255 The court did not analyze the function of either
position, but summarily concluded that neither was ministerial in nature.256
Thus, precedent required the court to adopt a ministerial employee test much
later in Alcazar, as it had not articulated one before. 257
B. The Problems with Ministerial Exception Jurisprudence (Sorting Out the
Mess)
Since McClure, the circuit courts have accepted universally the
ministerial exception as applied to the quintessential “minister.”258 When the
nature of the position in question falls so comfortably within the definition
of minister as to indicate unambiguously the need for church autonomy, all
the circuits agree that the Religion Clauses mandate an exception.259
However, when the facts require courts to examine the outer boundaries of
the exception, hardly any of them agree.260 Indeed, at times the circuits have
even contradicted their own precedent.261
1. The Primary Duties Test (The Inconsistency Problem)
As the Ninth Circuit demonstrated, the facts of Alcazar effectively
highlight the problems with the primary duties test.262 The Supreme Court

255. Id. at 1368. This is essentially the Sherbert test, which is rooted in the individual free
exercise strand of law, rather than the church autonomy strand of law, under which the ministerial
exception falls. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. In Alcazar, the court (correctly) did not examine
the burden on the church, but rather concluded that autonomy controlled regardless of the burden,
creating inconsistent precedent in the Ninth Circuit. See supra Parts II.A.2.b, III.A.2.c; see also
discussion supra Part III.A.1.b.
256. Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1370.
257. See supra notes 240–41. It is surprising that the court found no opportunity to articulate a
ministerial employee test before Alcazar, given that both Pacific Press and Fremont involved the
application of the ministerial exception to employees of a religious institution outside the clergy.
See supra text accompanying notes 252–53.
258. As Justice Alito pointed out in his Hosanna-Tabor concurrence, the term minister can be
misleading and should be used only as a term of art. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 711 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). Because the United States plays
host to almost every religion in the world, creating a standard around ordination or the term
“minister” would create a prejudice against many religious organizations to which the exception
absolutely applies. Id.
259. See discussion supra Part III.A.
260. See discussion supra Part III.A.
261. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.c; see also supra note 255.
262. See supra notes 233–49 and accompanying text.
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decided that the Sixth Circuit, in a perfectly rational application of the test,
came to the wrong conclusion.263 The main problem with the primary duties
test is the inconsistent results it produces.
The circuit courts applied the primary duties test to teachers in Catholic
University, Dole, and Hosanna-Tabor.264 When the District of Columbia
Circuit applied the test to a teacher in Catholic University, it held that the
position “clearly fit[] the description” of minister under the primary duties
test.265 In Dole, the Fourth Circuit applied the ministerial exception to a
group of teachers and decided their positions were not ministerial in
function.266 The teachers taught at a Baptist school that adhered to Baptist
values and doctrine, but, unlike the District of Columbia Circuit in Catholic
University, the Fourth Circuit held that they were not ministers.267
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Sixth Circuit held that the “called” teachers at
the school were not ministers even though they were ordained by the
Lutheran Church, taught religious subjects, and were charged with
promoting Lutheran beliefs.268 The court ignored the fact that the church
considered Perich to be an ordained minister and dissected the hours in her
day to determine that her secular duties defined her teaching position more
than her religious duties; it thus concluded that she was not a minister.269 As
the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Alcazar, however, the number of secular
duties or the time spent performing them often has nothing to do with how
religious a position may or may not be.270 The disparity created in these
cases by the application of the same test is disconcerting. Catholic
University, Dole, and Hosanna-Tabor each applied the same test to
essentially the same position—teaching—and came to different
conclusions.271 These cases alone demonstrate the lack of reliability in
applying the primary duties test.
In other instances, the primary duties of the position have been clearly
more secular than religious, and yet courts still inexplicably (and yet

263. See infra Part III.C.2.
264. See supra Part III.A.1.
265. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
266. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1396 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The teachers in
the present case perform no sacerdotal functions; neither do they serve as church governors.”); see
also supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
267. Supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A.1.b.
268. See supra Part III.A.1.c.
269. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.c. The Supreme Court specifically disagreed with the
court’s choice not to consider Perich’s ministerial title. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 698 (2012). Not only was the title not dispositive, but
according to the Sixth Circuit, it was barely probative. See infra Part III.C.2.
270. See supra notes 233–49 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 179–82, 188–99, 200–11 and accompanying text.
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correctly, if the spirit of the exception is the yardstick272) have held the
positions to be ministerial.273 In Shaliehsabou, the employee was a kosher
supervisor in charge of inspecting food.274 It would be very hard to argue
that inspecting food is more of a religious duty than teaching a religious
subject (which Perich did at Hosanna-Tabor).275 However, that is exactly
how the two decisions came out.276 The Fourth Circuit held that the food
inspector position was ministerial, while the Sixth Circuit held that the
teaching position was not.277 Because the Fourth Circuit in Shaliehsabou in
actuality looked at the purpose of the exception and the fact that the position
was “pervasively religious,”278 it came out the right way. However, the right
conclusion was a fluke. The continued use of the primary duties test will
create more inconsistent results like those of Shaliehsabou, Hosanna-Tabor,
Dole, and Catholic University.
2. Strict Scrutiny (The Entanglement Problem)
On more than one occasion the circuits have come dangerously close to
“question[ing] the centrality of particular beliefs,” a practice, known as
asking the “pretextual question,” consistently eschewed by the Supreme
Court.279 One might even argue that they have done it outright. In Pacific
Press and Fremont, the Ninth Circuit not only failed to apply any ministerial
employee test to the positions in question, but it also specifically analyzed
the centrality of the churches’ beliefs to determine that its beliefs and
doctrine were not threatened.280 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit in Dole
determined that the question of whether to compensate heads of household
differently did not “cut to the heart of Shenandoah’s beliefs.”281

272. See supra notes 159–66 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Part III.A.1.c.
276. See supra notes 183–87, 200–11 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 183–87, 200–11 and accompanying text.
278. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008).
279. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); see also supra notes 50, 60, 82, 90 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 286, 288, 344–48 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 250–57 and accompanying text; see also Bollard v. Cal. Province of the
Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the Sherbert balancing test to determine
whether the application of Title VII violates the Free Exercise Clause).
281. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1397 (4th Cir. 1990); see supra notes
179–81 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, all three cases rejected the ministerial
exception.282 The Sixth Circuit did not interpret church doctrine in HosannaTabor, but in Alcazar, the Ninth Circuit posited that “the very process of
civil court inquiry into the clergy-church relationship can be sufficient
entanglement.”283 The main problem in these cases is the application of
strict scrutiny, a standard of review that requires balancing the state’s
interest against the burden on free exercise.284 This is a process that, when
applied to a religious organization rather than an individual, by definition
calls for inquiry into the value and importance of any number of religious
tenets.285 For this reason, Religion Clause history shows strict scrutiny as
applicable to the individual free exercise line of cases, not the church
autonomy line of cases.286 The ministerial exception is based in the latter.287
In Pacific Press, the court looked for a compelling state interest to justify the
burden on the publishing house’s free exercise and found that the state
interest heavily outweighed the burden because there was no burden at all:
Preventing discrimination can have no significant impact upon the
exercise of Adventist beliefs because the Church proclaims that it
does not believe in discriminating against women or minority
groups, and that its policy is to pay wages without discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, sex, age, or national origin. Thus,
enforcement of Title VII’s equal pay provision does not and could
not conflict with Adventist religious doctrines, nor does it prohibit
an activity “rooted in religious belief.”288

282. See supra notes 179–82, 250–57 and accompanying text.
283. Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 598 F.3d 668, 672, 672–73 (9th Cir.
2010); see supra note 236; see also infra Part III.C.3.
284. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 90, 183–87 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 288–89 and
accompanying text.
286. See supra Part II.A.2, III.A.1.b. Because of the required balancing of interests involved in
the application of strict scrutiny, this is not a standard of review that can avoid the pretextual
question if applied carefully. Strict scrutiny balancing violates the goal of the ministerial exception
on its face. See infra note 288.
287. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[W]hile it is true that
some of the cases that have invoked the ministerial exception have cited the compelling interest test,
all of them rely on a long line of Supreme Court cases that affirm the fundamental right of churches
to ‘decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those
of faith and doctrine.’” (citation omitted)). It should be noted that citing a test and using it are two
different things. In this instance, the court cited McClure, which was quoting the Sherbert test. See
also supra Part II.A.2.
288. EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 1982). The court in
Fremont heavily relied on Pacific Press to come to essentially the same conclusion. See supra notes
250–57 and accompanying text. The Court’s conclusion in Hosanna-Tabor regarding the pretextual
question directly contradicts the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning:
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The court did not examine the duties of the female employee, as would have
been typical in a ministerial exception case, but instead delved into the
substance of Seventh-Day Adventist beliefs to conclude for them that their
doctrine would not be affected—this is the precise type of question that the
judiciary has no authority to determine.289 Autonomy does not question
whether activity “rooted in religious belief” is “prohibit[ed],” but whether
that activity is examined at all.290 It is not up to the courts to decide what
action does or does not comport with religious doctrine.291 It has been long
recognized in the area of church autonomy that strict scrutiny (or any
standard of judicial review) has no place when there are some free exercise
interests that trump any state interest, compelling or otherwise.292 As the
Ninth Circuit has said, “Some religious interests under the Free Exercise
Clause are so strong that no compelling state interest justifies government
intrusion into the ecclesiastical sphere.”293
Simply put, there is nothing reliable about ministerial exception
jurisprudence in the circuit courts. Tests are applied and precedent
interpreted so unpredictably as to warrant an explanation from the Supreme
Court. When the Court granted certiorari on March 28, 2011, and agreed to
hear Hosanna-Tabor, it seemed as though one was coming.294

That . . . misses the point of the ministerial exception. The purpose of the exception is
not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious
reason. The exception instead ensures that the authority to select and control who will
minister to the faithful—a matter “strictly ecclesiastical”—is the church’s alone.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012) (citation
omitted).
289. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1279; see also supra notes 50, 60, 82, 90, 279, 286 and
accompanying text. In fact, the result of this case was probably accurate. Had the court applied any
of the ministerial employee tests, the employee should have been found not to be ministerial. See
discussion supra III.A.1, III.A.2.a–b. But the fact that the court could have come to the right result
using proper analysis makes it all the more inexcusable that it applied the wrong test.
290. See supra text accompanying note 288.
291. See Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir.
1985) (“[W]e may not then inquire whether the reason for Rayburn’s rejection had some explicit
grounding in theological belief.”).
292. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
293. Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1999).
294. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011)
(mem.).
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C. The Supreme Court (Almost) Speaks: Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC
On January 11, 2012, the Supreme Court confirmed, in a quick 9–0
decision, the existence of the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.295 Although it reversed
the Sixth Circuit by holding that Perich was a ministerial employee,296 the
Court upheld over forty years of circuit law by adopting the exception.297
However, it did little more than that. Chief Justice Roberts announced the
opinion of the Court, which unanimously held that there was a ministerial
exception and that it did apply to Perich.298 However, the decision was silent
on many issues the circuits have debated amongst themselves since the
McClure court first articulated the exception in 1971.299 The narrow holding
failed to clarify any number of issues raised by the circuit courts over the
years, and the questions that surround the ministerial exception went
unanswered.
1. Facts of the Case
In 1999, Perich began her employment relationship with Hosanna-Tabor
as a “lay teacher.”300 Hosanna-Tabor, a member of the Lutheran ChurchMissouri Synod, operates a small school where students can receive a
“Christ-centered education” and employs “lay” and “called” teachers.301 Lay
teachers (also called “contract” teachers) do not require any particular
training and are only hired when called teachers are unavailable.302 “Called”
teacher requirements include substantial theological study, as well as
endorsement by the teacher’s Synod.303 Hosanna-Tabor employed Perich as
a lay teacher for only a short time until she obtained her diploma of
vocation, designating her a commissioned minister, and she became a called
teacher.304 In addition to various secular subjects such as math and science,
Perich taught a religion class four days a week.305 She also led organized
prayers, and both attended and occasionally led the weekly school-wide

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
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132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
Id. at 707.
See supra Parts II.C, III.A (discussing the circuit court ministerial exception cases).
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
See supra Part III.A–B.
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 699–700.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 700.
Id.
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chapel service.306
In June 2004, Perich developed narcolepsy and went on disability leave
before the start of the 2004–2005 school year.307 In January 2005, Perich
notified the school that she was able to return to work.308 However, the
principal informed her that the school had filled her position for the
remainder of the school year.309 The school not only replaced Perich but also
questioned her fitness to be around students in the classroom and doubted
that she would be able to return to work at all.310 The administration asked
her to “peaceful[ly]” resign her call and Perich refused, producing a note
from her physician that indicated her ability to return to work.311 When
Perich presented herself for work, the principal asked her to leave, which she
did only after obtaining written documentation of her appearance.312 When
the principal later told Perich that she likely would be fired, Perich
threatened legal action.313 The school board met and decided to rescind
Perich’s call; she was sent a letter of termination in April.314
Perich, together with the EEOC, brought claims against Hosanna-Tabor
for unlawful retaliation, and she sought both reinstatement and damages.315
The school moved for summary judgment, citing the ministerial exception as
a bar to Perich’s claims.316 The district court granted Hosanna-Tabor’s
motion, but the Sixth Circuit reversed on appeal, finding that Perich’s
position was not ministerial.317
2. Chief Justice Roberts Delivers the Opinion of the Court
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts first established that the
question presented was “whether the Establishment and Free Exercise

306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 701.
316. Id.
317. Id.; see also supra Part III.A.1.c. The Sixth Circuit vacated the order and remanded,
instructing the district court to make a finding on the merits of Perich’s discrimination claim. EEOC
v. Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 782 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
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Clauses of the First Amendment bar . . . an [employment discrimination]
action when the employer is a religious group and the employee is one of the
group’s ministers.”318 Roberts moved through the history of the Religion
Clauses and the development of church autonomy.319 He ended the journey
by acknowledging that the ministerial exception has been recognized by the
circuit courts for many years and adopted it into Supreme Court
jurisprudence.320
Perich argued that there is no need for a special rule rooted in the
Religion Clauses when the same First Amendment rights that protect
everyone else also protect ministers.321 The Court declined the invitation to
hold thusly.322 It next refused to adopt Perich’s position that the ministerial
exception could not stand in light of Smith.323 Like the District of Columbia
Circuit,324 the Court concluded that the Smith decision was unrelated to the
application of the ministerial exception.325
Nothing about the Court’s conclusions up to this point was surprising, as
the circuits had held unanimously thus for over forty years.326 The aspect of
the Court’s decision that had been eagerly anticipated—the aspect that had
garnered national attention—was the Court’s explication of a rule defining
the boundaries of a ministerial position under the exception.327 The Court,

318. Id. at 699. By framing the question thusly, the Court immediately demonstrated its
unwillingness to establish a clear ministerial employee test by addressing the issue on which the
circuit courts agree, rather than the one that has created such disparity among them. Since McClure,
the circuits courts have universally recognized that the ministerial exception exists. See supra Parts
II.C, III.A; see also infra note 320 and accompanying text.
319. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702–05; see also supra Part II.
320. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705–06 (“[T]he Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized
the existence of a ‘ministerial exception,’ grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes
application of such legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministers. We agree that there is such a ministerial exception.”).
321. Id. at 706. This proposition contravenes Watson and its progeny. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
The Court is quite right in calling Perich’s position “untenable” when the importance of the churchminister relationship is so well established. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706; supra notes 159–
66 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia particularly was unimpressed with the argument. Oral
Argument at 31:15, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(No. 10-553), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_553 (“We are
talking here about the Free Exercise Clause and about the Establishment Clause, and you say they
have no special application? . . . [Y]ou can, by an extension of First Amendment rights, derive such
a [result], but there, black on white in the text of the Constitution are special protections for religion.
And you say that makes no difference?”).
322. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
323. Id.
324. The Court did not take the time to discuss in detail the reasons behind its dismissal of this
proposition; however, the District of Columbia Circuit thoroughly justified its reasoning in EEOC v.
Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also supra Part III.A.1.b.
325. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
326. See discussion supra Part III.A.
327. See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, THE BECKET FUND,
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however, was “reluctant . . . to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an
employee qualifies as a minister.”328 Instead, it delineated all the facts that,
according to the Court, put Perich squarely within the exception.329
It placed heavy emphasis on the fact that both the church and Perich
herself held her out to the world as a minister to the congregation.330 The
church did so by giving Perich the official title of minister, while Perich did
so by claiming housing allowances on her taxes, accepting the call from
Hosanna-Tabor, and referring to herself as a minister in written
correspondence.331 The Court gave substantially more weight to Perich’s
title as minister than did the Sixth Circuit before it;332 however, while the
Court said that the Sixth Circuit erred in concluding that a title is not
relevant,333 it did not consider as a factor the title alone.334 Chief Justice
Roberts considered the title only because of the significant amount of
religious training that accompanied it:
Perich’s title as a minister reflected a significant degree of
religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning.
To be eligible to become a commissioned minister, Perich had to
complete eight college-level courses in subjects including biblical
interpretation, church doctrine, and the ministry of the Lutheran
teacher. She also had to obtain the endorsement of her local Synod
district by submitting a petition that contained her academic
transcripts, letters of recommendation, personal statement, and
written answers to various ministry-related questions. Finally, she
had to pass an oral examination by a faculty committee at a

http://www.becketfund.org/hosannatabor/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2012) (listing press publications
regarding Hosanna-Tabor).
328. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. Chief Justice Roberts was satisfied “that the exception
cover[ed] Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.” Id.
329. Id. at 707–08.
330. Id. at 707.
331. Id. at 707–08.
332. Id. at 708 (“It was wrong for the Court of Appeals—and Perich, who has adopted the court’s
view—to say that an employee’s title does not matter.” (citation omitted)).
333. Id. (“Although such a title, by itself, does not automatically ensure coverage, the fact that an
employee has been ordained or commissioned as a minister is surely relevant, as is the fact that
significant religious training and a recognized religious mission underlie the description of the
employee’s position.”).
334. Id. at 707.
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It took Perich six years to fulfill these

The reasoning behind the Court’s conclusion that title is a relevant factor is
undermined by the fact that it felt the need to support that conclusion with
evidence, not of Perich’s title, but of her extensive religious training.336 In
holding that the title of minister always carries significant weight, the Court
ignored a possible factual scenario in which someone is given the title
arbitrarily.337
The Court criticized the primary duties test when it disagreed with the
weight the Sixth Circuit gave to the fact that lay and contract teachers at
Hosanna-Tabor had the same duties, as well as to the fact that Perich
performed many secular duties.338 Because the Sixth Circuit used the
primary duties test, the functional comparison between the two types of
teachers was given substantial weight.339 The only basis the Court gave for
this conclusion, however, was that contract teachers were only hired when
called teachers were unavailable.340
In rejecting the secular duties
emphasis,341 the Court took a position similar to that of the Second and Ninth
Circuits, which both expressed concerns about a purely functional
approach.342 The Court seemed to accept the general idea that some
employment relationships “may be so pervasively religious” that the number
of secular duties becomes irrelevant.343
Finally, the Court did speak on one unsettled issue. Throughout church
autonomy and ministerial exception jurisprudence, as well as the HosannaTabor oral arguments, the issue of the so-called “pretextual question”
continued to arise.344 The Court, however, dismissed the issue with haste:

335. Id.
336. Id. at 707–08.
337. This holding also makes interesting Justice Alito’s observation that “some faiths consider
the ministry to consist of all or a very large percentage of their members.” Id. at 713–14 (Alito, J.,
concurring); see also supra note 357 and accompanying text. If the title of minister weighs heavily
in favor of applying the exception, it should follow that there are some faiths wherein the exception
would apply to every member. The Fourth Circuit in Dole specifically dismissed this possibility.
See supra text accompanying note 182.
338. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708.
339. See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d,
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); see also supra Part III.A.1.c.
340. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708.
341. Id. at 709 (“The issue before us . . . is not one that can be resolved by a stopwatch.”).
342. See supra Parts III.A.2.b–c. The Ninth Circuit, of course, vacated this conclusion. See
supra note 235.
343. See supra text accompanying note 231.
344. See supra notes 50, 60, 82, 90, 279, 286, 288 and accompanying text; see also Oral
Argument at 46:30, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(No. 10-553), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_553.
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The EEOC and Perich suggest that Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted
religious reason for firing Perich—that she violated the Synod’s
commitment to internal dispute resolution—was pretextual. That
suggestion misses the point of the ministerial exception. The
purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to
fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The
exception instead ensures that the authority to select and control
who will minister to the faithful—a matter “strictly ecclesiastical”—
is the church’s alone.345
In this brief statement, the Court rejected the idea that it is appropriate to
examine a church’s decision for “fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness”346 and to
deny ministerial exception protection on those grounds.347 This conclusion
is supported by ample precedent holding that, in general, “It is not within the
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”348
3. Justices Thomas and Alito Concur
Despite the Court’s surprising 9–0 decision, Justices Thomas and Alito
added concurring opinions expressing views tangential to the Court’s
holding.349 Justice Thomas did not add much to the majority opinion, except
to say that “[t]he question whether an employee is a minister is itself
religious in nature,”350 a point that echoes the Ninth Circuit’s in Alcazar that
the “very process of civil court inquiry into the clergy-church relationship
can be sufficient entanglement.”351
Justice Alito clarified his view on the confusion surrounding the term
“minister.”352 He made it clear that the term should only be thought of as a

345. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (citation omitted) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)). This conclusion
invalidates reasoning in multiple circuit cases. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
347. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709.
348. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Hernandez v.
Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)); see also supra notes 50, 60, 82, 90, 279 and accompanying
text.
349. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring); Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at
711 (Alito, J., concurring).
350. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring).
351. Supra notes 236, 283 and accompanying text.
352. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 711 (Alito, J., concurring).
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type of “shorthand” because if taken literally, it would surely exclude some
of the many different religions represented in the United States.353 He took a
somewhat radical view on what type of employee should fall under the
ministerial exception. Justice Alito argued that autonomy must be
maintained because “[f]orcing a group to accept certain members may
impair [its ability] to express those views, and only those views, that it
intends to express.”354 He said religious groups are “the archetype of
associations formed for expressive purposes, and their fundamental rights
surely include the freedom to choose who is qualified to serve as a voice for
their faith.”355 These ideas support the argument that all employees of a
religious organization should fall under the ministerial exception, depending
on what a church considers an action that gives “a voice” to their faith.356 A
church could argue that employment of an individual in any position is a
tacit admission that the individual’s beliefs are representative of those held
by the religious organization as a whole. Justice Alito continued this theme
by pointing out that many churches consider most, if not all, of their
members to be ministers.357
IV. WHAT HAPPENS NOW: THE AD HOC TEST ARGUMENT (THE SENSIBLE
SOLUTION)
The Court deliberately and specifically avoided settling the questions
raised by the application of the ministerial exception.358 Ruling on the case
more quickly and in more agreement than most constitutional law scholars
predicted, the Court’s only aim was to adopt the ministerial exception while
avoiding the “tough constitutional question.”359 The Court dismissed the
“parade of horribles” espoused by the government in Hosanna-Tabor that
included sexual harassment and other such torts.360 The Court was quite

353. Id.
354. Id. at 712 (alterations in original) (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648
(2000)); see also infra note 357.
355. Id. at 713.
356. Id.; see also supra note 351.
357. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 713–14. This marked the second time Justice Alito implied
that perhaps all members of the church should be covered by the exception. It first occurred when
he quoted Dale without any attempt to distinguish between the words “member” and “employee.”
Id. at 712; see also supra notes 337, 351 and accompanying text. This is an interesting and
seemingly meritorious proposition, but its examination is outside the scope of this Comment.
358. See supra Part III.C.2.
359. Oral Argument at 46:30, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132
S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_553.
360. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. The circuits have generally agreed that such claims
would not be barred. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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right; that will not be the lasting problem created by the decision.361
The circuit courts have not been able to agree on a clear test and at times
have even contradicted themselves.362 The only possible direction the
circuits can take from the Supreme Court’s decision—though not ironclad—
is that it seems that the Court does not agree with the primary duties test.363
However, even this conclusion requires an inference because the Court held
(very narrowly) only that the exception exists and that it applied to Perich.364
This leaves the circuits, as they have done for forty years, to fend for
themselves. Given that strategy’s past application and resulting confusing,365
this is not exactly an encouraging prospect.
In Rweyemamu, the Second Circuit, though not dealing with the
application of a ministerial employee test, nonetheless explicated an ad hoctype test that most accurately reflects the spirit of the ministerial
exception.366 By acknowledging that the relationship in question may be “so
pervasively religious” as to warrant a ministerial finding, the court
recognized that these are questions of such complexity that a blanket rule
may not be possible.367 The inconsistencies in other circuit decisions also
demonstrate that this issue should be examined on a case-by-case basis.368
Many courts have acknowledged that “virtually every religion in the world is
represented in the population of the United States.”369 With different
religions come different doctrines and different ideas of what constitutes a
ministerial position.370 As has been shown, it is possible to have a
“pervasively religious” position that comprises mostly secular duties.371
Creating an inflexible rule or list of criteria, such as the primary duties
test, will only lead to more inconsistent holdings like those in the circuit

361. Supra note 358.
362. See supra Part III.B.
363. See supra notes 338–43 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 327–29 and accompanying text.
365. See supra Part III.B.
366. See supra Part II.C.
367. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008). The fact that the Supreme Court
chose to rule so narrowly in Hosanna-Tabor also supports this conclusion. See infra Part III.C.2.
368. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the inconsistent application of the primary duties test).
369. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 711 (2012)
(Alito, J., concurring).
370. For example, Justice Alito recognized the diversity when he criticized the Christian
connotation of the exception because “the concept of ordination as understood by most Christian
churches and by Judaism has no clear counterpart in some Christian denominations and some other
religions.” Id.
371. See supra notes 240–44 and accompanying text.
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courts.372 Church autonomy is at the root of the ministerial exception,373 and
it is based on a religious organization’s fundamental right—a right that
surpasses the government’s interest in eradicating discrimination—“to
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”374 This conflict between
fundamental rights is too substantial to support anything but a fact-intensive
analysis. Each ministerial exception case should, as Rweyemamu suggests,
look at the nature of the dispute. This way, the courts can determine
whether the exception is required to maintain a religious organization’s right
of autonomy that is based in the Religion Clauses.375
V. CONCLUSION
There is much breadth to the church autonomy doctrine. One aspect of
it—the ministerial exception—requires courts to answer difficult
constitutional questions that arise when two fundamental rights conflict.
While the Supreme Court has established that the Religion Clauses
supersede the government’s interest in enforcing anti-discrimination laws,376
its unwillingness to explicate or adopt a clear ministerial employee test
leaves open the question of the shape and extent of the exception. As long
as they do not directly contradict Hosanna-Tabor—a near impossibility—
the circuit courts likely will continue to apply tests of their own design. As
articulated in this Comment, an ad hoc approach that examines the religious
nature of the position in question would cause the least amount of
confusion.377 In order to avoid inconsistent application of the ministerial
exception, the circuit courts should utilize this ad hoc test until the Supreme
Court speaks on this issue again.

Summer E. Allen*

372. See supra Parts III.A.1.a, III.A.1.c, III.B.1.
373. See supra Parts II.A.2, II.C.
374. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116
(1952).
375. The test articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Starkman is also essentially ad hoc and holds true
to the spirit of the exception. See supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text.
376. See supra Parts II.A.2.a, II.C, III.C.2.
377. See supra notes 366–75 and accompanying text.
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